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How has cultural relativism been applied by anthropologists in the  
study of law and the social contestation on human rights? In this essay the 
author explores the concept of cultural relativism as a method of cultural 
description 
 
Cultural Relativism, Legal Anthropology and Human Rights 
Andrew Price 
 
I am human and nothing human is 
 alien to me. Terence, 163 B.C. 
My own group aside, everything human 
is alien to me.  Renato Rosaldo 
 
Cultural relativism claims that there is 
ethically, morally, and culturally no 
absolute truth, and that when observing 
another culture one must suspend all 
judgments because those judgments are 
inherently ethnocentric (Zechenter, 
1997). Relativism flourished in the 
1930s and 40s with noted 
anthropologists such as Boas, Benedict 
and Herskovitz. It was during this time 
that relativism set forth and combined 
two important principles: (1) skepticism 
of Western values and (2) tolerance for 
other cultural practices (Hatch, 1997). 
Not all anthropologists embraced this 
idea, in fact some major players in the 
field such as Ralph Linton, Robert 
Redfield, and A.L. Kroeber were quite 
critical of relativism, and to this day 
relativism is a theory to be “…more 
often attacked than embraced” (Hatch, 
1997: 371). Hatch claims that relativism 
is flawed in its call for humans to be 
nonjudgmental in the face of human 
atrocities like genocide, torture, or 
female genital mutilation, but also 
believes that relativism should not be 
thrown out all together. Among 
anthropologists it can be said that, in 
some respects, most are relativists, and 
in other respects, non-relativists. It is 
difficult for an anthropologist to suspend 
all moral judgment when observing 
another culture, but in many ways this is 
the ultimate goal of the observer, 
therefore it would be absurd not to 
embrace any form or aspect of 
relativism. 
Relativism essentially has three 
different levels of theoretical thinking. 
The first level is Descriptive, or Weak 
Relativism. This is the most rudimentary 
of the three, which simply takes a face 
value observational approach under the 
premise that every culture is different. 
The second level is Normative 
Relativism or Strong Relativism, a claim 
that because cultures are different, 
standards are culturally bound and there 
is no way to set “transcultural” moral 
and ethical standards. Finally the third 
level is Epistemological Relativism or 
Extreme Relativism, which has been 
endorsed and exemplified by Geertz and 
his followers. Geertz believes that 
“Humans are shaped exclusively by their 
culture and therefore there exists no 
unifying cross-cultural human 
characteristics” (Zechenter, 1997: 323). 
Geertz’s form of relativism states that 
because all cultures are mutually 
exclusive and therefore existent under 
independent cultural factors, there is no 
meaningful way of judging any cultural 
practice outside of our own. As an 
observer, Geertz would argue, any type 
of study of another culture, with the 
exception of sterile literate 
documentation of exact happenings, is 
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ethnocentric, inaccurate and therefore an 
ideologically tainted practice within the 
Social Sciences. 
Cultural Relativism is not without its 
flaws. Kluckhohn believed that Cultural 
relativism is intellectually irresponsible. 
If one is to literally act upon the claims 
of ethical relativism then one must be so 
compelled as to accept any cultural 
happenings as legitimate and justified 
through the claim and sanctity of culture 
difference. For example, Kluckhohn in 
the case of Nazism argues under the 
theory of cultural relativism, the world 
must accept such ideals and actions 
because to not accept them and pass 
judgment is to be ethnocentric and 
ultimately worse than the Nazi rhetoric 
itself (Zechenter, 1997). Additionally, 
authors such as Allan Bloom have 
attacked the theory of cultural relativism. 
Cultural relativism, says Bloom, has 
created an abundance of Social 
Scientists and students who “are unable 
and/or unwilling to evaluate cultures” 
(Foster, 1991: 257). This type of 
thinking in the social sciences essentially 
offers no meaningful answers to 
questions that continue to plague the 
field, such as the concept and application 
of human rights to a culturally diverse 
global model. Cultural Relativism is not 
only flawed, but it assumes that culture 
is a static concept completely unaffected 
by change, growth, and technology. 
Cultural Relativism “…tends to justify 
the dysfunctional beliefs and customs of 
non-Western cultures while 
marginalizing nondominant voices 
within those societies” (Zechenter, 1997: 
327-328). 
 
Cultural Relativism as a Method 
 
Glazer claims that Cultural Relativism 
"is a key methodological concept which 
is universally accepted within the 
discipline" (1996) of anthropology. As a 
method in anthropology, Cultural 
Relativism presumes equality among 
cultures and a need for unbiased study to 
fully and more accurately understand 
cultural phenomena. The general idea is 
that cultural relativism provides the 
framework for neutral cultural studies in 
order to insure that cultures, as Glazer 
puts it, are to be judged on their own 
cultural merits (1996). Boas used 
cultural relativism as new 
methodological approach to studying 
cultures, and initiated the crossover from 
the comparative method, to the 
observational and merit based (anti-
comparative if you will) method. 
According to Glazer, to justify his 
beliefs, Boas described four limitations 
to the comparative method, which are 
essentially corrected by the 
implementation of cultural relativism: 
 
1. It is impossible to account for 
similarity in all the types of culture by 
claiming that they are so because of 
the unity of the human mind. 2. The 
existence like traits in different 
cultures is not as important as the 
comparative school claims. 3. Similar 
traits may have developed for very 
different purposed in differing 
cultures. 4. The view that cultural 
differences are of minor importance is 
baseless. (Glazer, 1996). 
 
Under the relativist method a social 
scientist would study the traits of a 
culture in great detail while taking into 
account the culture as a whole and that 
cultural bleed off of traits into 
neighboring cultures (Glazer, 1996) 
must also be taken into account in order 
to grasp and appreciate culture as an 
isolated and independent phenomenon. It 
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was believed by Boas that this 
methodology would allow 
anthropologists "(1) to understand the 
environmental factors that shape a 
culture, (2) to explain the psychological 
factors that frame the culture, and (3) to 
explain the history of a local custom" 
(Glazer, 1996). Ultimately cultural 
relativism can be viewed as Boas' 
establishment of an inductive 
methodology for anthropology as well as 
the rest of the social sciences. In using 
an inductive form of methodology and 
discarding the comparative method, 
anthropologists would be able to better 
study cultures solely on the merits of the 
accumulated data, and not with a biased 
cross cultural comparison. 
  
The Application of Cultural 
Relativism To Human Rights Issues 
 
Perhaps the greatest, or most 
widespread, application of cultural 
relativism is in the area of human rights 
and the analysis of cross cultural belief 
systems. In the article Human Rights, 
Human Difference: Anthropology’s 
Contribution to an Emancipatory 
Cultural Politics, Terence Turner 
discusses the concepts of fundamental 
human rights and the application of 
Cultural Relativism to these rights. 
Human Rights, Turner claims, is the idea 
that somehow as a person or peoples 
there exists an intrinsic and inherent 
right to certain privileges such as the 
right to not get tortured, the right to 
freedom, or even the right to equal 
opportunities. Exactly how or what 
enables a person to claim such concepts 
as being universal does present 
problems. “The ability to make such 
claims is often assumed to imply or 
presuppose the existence of some 
institutional means of enforcing them, 
binding on the society that recognizes 
the rights in question (normally the state 
or mechanism such as the feud in 
stateless societies)” (Turner, 1997: 274-
275).     
Does there always exist an institution 
or mechanisms to enforce rights that 
someone claims to have? Is it legitimate 
for anyone to claim anything and have 
his or her views of rights legitimized 
under the sovereignty of Cultural 
relativism? Turner suggests that there 
may be difficulty in claiming that human 
rights are universal, especially when it is 
being applied to non-universal concepts 
which such as social institutions and 
States. Social institutions and states are 
unique happenings that occur in some 
cultures but not others. Is it possible to 
claim a universal “right” in a non-
universal situation? Applying the 
Western ideal of rights gets sticky when 
attempting to apply them to non-western 
models because of Cultural Relativism 
stepping in and pulling the 
ethnocentrism card. 
The origins of human rights are 
primarily a Western concept. It has been 
Western culture that has formulated and 
produced the idea that humanness is a 
possession of the individual in question, 
and that this possession of humanness 
entitles the individual to rights. 
Furthermore, when individuals come 
together, as in the case of a society or 
culture, the humanness of the collect 
somehow, in the western ideal, merits 
collective rights. Turner questions 
whether or not a universal principle of 
right is incompatible with Cultural 
Relativism. “For many anthropologists, 
of course, ‘cultural relativism’ is not a 
fully developed theoretical position but, 
rather, a commitment to suspending 
moral judgment until an attempt can be 
made to understand another culture’s 
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beliefs and practices” (Turner, 1997: 
275). 
Cultural Relativism is nothing more 
than a universal claim that presumes that 
all cultures are one in the same. For this 
to be true it must be proven that all 
cultures posses the same qualities and 
beliefs towards social value of the 
individual, therefore giving inherent 
personal rights. In addition, scholars 
such as Messer discuss the topics of 
Cultural Relativism and Anti-Cultural 
Relativism and their applications to 
Universalism. Messer states that there 
are essentially two reasons that 
anthropologists have been opposed to 
Universalistic claims: (1) Universalist 
claims reject the concept of individual 
rights as being universally self-evident. 
In 1947 the American Anthropological 
Association (AAA) issued a statement of 
international human rights saying, 
“…standards and values are relative to 
the culture from which they derive” 
(293). (2) Rejection also comes from a 
belief that ‘individual rights” are 
Western and therefore ethnocentric. 
Some anthropologists also distrust the 
idea of international human rights 
because its implementation creates 
instruments of arbitration and a global 
morality, which can over-ride and 
supercede a cultural community and its 
values. Anti-cultural Relativists seem to 
put forth many of the same concerns as 
that of the Cultural Relativist. They both 
argue that modern human rights are 
distinctly different from all other cultural 
rights traditions because “specific 
cultural expressions of moral or social 
rights, however worthy and protective of 
human dignity, are not “human” rights. 
Under this assumption, those who follow 
the Anti-Relativist perspective also 
follow the U.N. human rights legal 
system as being a legitimate source for 
arbitration and a global moral order, and 
a legitimate expression for the peace and 
security of individuals worldwide. 
The case for universal human rights is 
rooted in historically western precedents. 
A drafting of these rights for the specific 
implementation of them upon humanity 
began in the late 1940s out of the 
aftermath of the Holocaust and 
proceedings of the Nuremberg trials. The 
roots for the appeal to universal human 
rights is also an extension of classic 
western thinking beginning with Greek 
philosophy, Roman law, Judeo-Christian 
tradition, Reformation humanism, and 
Enlightenment philosophy. This 
ideology further progresses with 
examination of historical documents 
such as the Magna Carta, the United 
States Declaration of rights, and the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen (Messer, 1997).  
It is worthy of noting that all such 
thinking and documentation was and is 
merely a self-serving testament to self-
preservation typically put forth by those 
in power to further promote their own 
interests. Such Western thought is also 
notably the result of works done by 
white land-owning males, and can be 
construed as simply a means to preserve 
their heightened standards of living over 
the norm population of the time. While 
this remains a predominantly western 
fact, there has been other cultural 
philosophy’s disputing such types of 
cultural promotions of self-interests. 
Asian philosophy has argued that the 
concept of political rights is non-existent 
and therefore foreign to the traditions of 
the Asian cultures. The focus of Asian 
culture has primarily been based on 
subsistence needs rather the civil 
liberties of its peoples. Western 
authorities, historically, have given 
precedence to civil and political rights 
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and by and large ignore the cultural 
socio-economic rights of any groups of 
people that are not Western. There is a 
tendency among these policy makers to 
disregard, if not completely throw-out 
the “…development or collective rights 
as derivative rights that compromise and 
gut the individual human rights concept” 
(Messer, 1997: 299). 
There is a certain amount of agreement 
between the Cultural Relativist and the 
Anti-Relativist, they agree that there 
does exist, in cultures, the concept of 
right and wrong. Legal language has 
called for black and white areas in 
human difference and thus helps create a 
culturally global universal concept of 
rights and wrongs.  The result is a 
“single universal formulation” (Messer, 
1997: 312), which dictates and 
elaborates on what is acceptable 
universally as the definition of human 
rights. 
 
Anthropology and the Law 
Legal anthropology, once just a small 
sub-field of anthropology concerned 
primarily with the study non-Western 
legal systems, now encompasses the 
Western, industrial, and transnational 
legal matters. “Its scope includes 
transnational treaties, legal 
underpinnings of transnational 
commerce, the field of human rights, 
diasporas and migrants, refugees and 
prisoners and other situations not easily 
captured in the earlier community-
grounded conception of anthropology” 
(Moore, 2001: 95). 
Law, is often perceived to be culturally 
“tradition-driven”, “however culture is 
simply a label denoting durable customs, 
ideas, values, habits, and practices” 
(Moore, 2001: 96). Law is not 
necessarily a culture, as some may note 
it to be, but rather a part of the package, 
which makes the whole. Moore also 
claims that law can be viewed as a mask 
for elitist interests and that “law purports 
to be about furthering the general 
interest, but really serves the cause of the 
powerful, generally capitalists and 
capitalism” (2001: 96). Furthermore law 
is used as a tool for a rationalist 
framework within the profession. Moore 
cites law, particularly Western law, as a 
social concept of “problem-solving”, and 
thus a tool to solve frequently occurring 
problems within a given culture (2001), 
and more recently, a problem solving too 
to deal with problems created by cross-
cultural borders.  
Law is power, and as Laura Nader 
clearly states throughout her work, to 
understand law is to understand how 
power works. To understand law and 
power, Nader has turned to non-Western 
cultures to explore what she refers to as 
the “ ‘Harmony of Law’ model, which 
encapsulates coercive compromise and 
consensus as a form of behavior 
modification” (1997: 712). Among the 
Zapotec Indians, Nader has noticed, a 
similarity between their indigenous court 
system and “international negotiation 
settings” (1997). “ I began to understand 
that the coercive power of legal 
ideologies had been missed by 
anthropologists caught up in a romantic 
notion of culture” (Nader, 1997: 712). 
Among the Zapotec, Nader has found 
the use of the harmony law model to be 
unique. Nader notes that the concept of 
harmony law was most likely introduced 
by the Spanish as a hegemonic tool, but 
that they “had began using it as a tool for 
restricting the encroachment of external, 
superordinate [sic] power” (1997: 213) 
thereby turning Harmony law into a 
counter-hegemonic tool used to ward 
against unwanted cross cultural 
influences. Nader’s work represents 
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clearly how a culture can use law for a 
two fold purpose; the first being social 
regulation of community legal problems 
in an attempt to satisfy social harmony, 
and the second being a defense 
mechanism against outside influence and 
the unwanted reconstructing of the 
cultural accept values of legal 
community rights. 
 
Law, Cultural Relativist Linked to 
Human Rights 
 
In his article in the Journal of Foreign 
Affairs, Franck discusses, candidly, the 
effects, disobedience, and want of 
personal freedom from international 
regulation of laws and human rights 
doctrine through cross-cultural 
examples.  
The Taliban, May 2000, who rule most 
of Afghanistan, order a mother of seven 
to be stoned to death in front of ecstatic 
men and children, in order to restitute for 
her crime of adultery. One-year prior, 
the House of Lords, provided refuge, for 
two Pakistani women who were accused 
of adultery, inside the UK. The reason: 
Had they stayed in Pakistan, they were 
surely to be at risk of public torture and 
possibly stoned to death in the home 
(Franck, 2001). In the face of all of this 
controversy of forbidding women to 
access public education, and leave the 
home unaccompanied, they (the Taliban) 
demand to be left alone in their religious 
beliefs and cultural standards just as the 
average American requests. “ Leaders in 
Kabul insist that they not be judged by 
the norms of others – especially in the 
West” (Franck, 2001: 191). 
The Taliban are not the only group 
who request the same treatment in the 
world arena, and reject such outside 
scrutiny. Franck points out that much the 
same request exist in the United States, 
the same power house that frequently 
pulls “call for fairness” cards on others. 
“Florida, after frying several prisoners in 
a faulty electric chair, has only 
reluctantly turned to other methods of 
execution to conform to the U.S. 
Constitution’s prohibition of ‘cruel and 
unusual punishment’” (Franck, 2001: 
191-192). He further points out that 
when many of our western allies claim 
that it is barbarous to have any 
executions, politicians ask them to mind 
their own business and respect the way 
they deal with citizens – just as the 
Taliban asks. 
These arguments have stemmed from a 
common cause among many nations. 
The thriving of human rights, postwar, 
has created two elements, dynamic to the 
issue: globalization and individualization 
(Franck, 2001). Globalization has 
created common standards of protections 
for all peoples in what Franck (2001) 
refers to as a “decentralized” world, 
through monitoring human rights 
violations and requiring compliance 
from cultures not wanting to comply, but 
simply have their cultural differences 
respected. Jamaica is a significant case 
exemplifying cultures that wish to have 
their belief systems respected. After the 
Commission of Experts representing the 
ICCPR (International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights) chastised Jamaica 
for the administration of the death 
penalty (an act the US is continually in 
violation of with no reprimanding), 
“Jamaica responded by withdrawing 
from the ICCPR”(Franck, 2001: 1993). 
Jamaica’s response was consistent with 
many other countries, “respect our 
culture, our unique problems” (Franck, 
2001: 193). In addition, most cultures, 
which come under scrutiny of the 
ICCPR, see this as an outright attack on 
there own legal and cultural identity. 
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While the Western authorities may view 
the Taliban’s actions as militant, 
barbarous, and socially deplorable, the 
Taliban has a much different 
perspective. They see themselves as 
“guardians of a religion and culture that 
should be exempted from a “Western” 
system of human rights” (Franck, 2001: 
195) and most of all exempt from having 
to abide by and succumb to international 
laws established by NATO (of which 
they are not a member). Again, as 
Franck has stated, this mimics the same 
views on international laws and 
regulations that the Western cultures 
have when they violate the ICCPR for 
the sake of cultural and social 
preservation of ways, rights and means. 
    
Conclusion 
 
Cultural Relativism, as a theory, method 
and application, possesses a great 
amount of responsibility to the field of 
Anthropology, as well as the greater 
Social Science system. With its theory 
based upon the assumption that cultures, 
and the individuals within those cultures, 
possess an inherent right to be sovereign 
from all judgment from any other culture 
system, this leaves very little room in the 
case for a universal human rights 
system. But the gaps and unanswered 
flaws of Relativism continue to plague 
arguments in favor of protecting a 
legitimate scenario of peoples and 
cultures being able to believe and 
practice as the wish without 
repercussions from a standardized global 
hierarchy. While many of the teachings 
by Anthropologists such as Boas and 
Geertz, have been both debunked and 
thrown out of most major 
Anthropological and Social Science 
thoughts and practices, Cultural 
Relativism’s major premise of simply 
observing a culture at face value still 
stands today as a standard practice of 
field data gathering. Perhaps the greatest 
contribution of Cultural Relativism, to 
the Social Sciences, and the world 
culture as a whole, is the establishment 
of cultural tolerance and a better attempt 
at non-ethnocentric cross-cultural 
observations. 
Furthermore, the study of law in 
anthropology is unlike legal studies of 
any other field. While law may typically 
be seen a tradition-driven mechanism by 
cultures, scholars such as Moore and 
Nader have expressed that law is not its 
own separate culture, but a part of the 
grand sum of a greater culture, and that 
the particular culture determines the 
modifications of law, not the other way. 
The understandings of law, as Nader 
believes, can come only through an 
understanding of power and how that 
power works. Cultures use power as a 
two fold tool, the first being social 
regulation of community legal problems 
in an attempt to satisfy social harmony, 
and the second being a defense 
mechanism against outside influence and 
the unwanted reconstructing of the 
cultural accept values of legal 
community rights.  
Finally, legal rights and human rights 
become sticky issues when they are 
applied cross culturally. With different 
beliefs systems it is hard enough for 
different cultures to see eye to eye, but 
the difficulty in understanding only 
increases when all cultures are required, 
by law and sanction, to operate under the 
same premise. It would seem that even 
the West, the primary developers of the 
ICCPR and human rights doctrine have a 
difficult time adhering to its own law 
and beliefs, ultimately reverting to the 
same justifications of the violations: 
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